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Computational social science (CSS) is best understood as an interdisciplinary field in the inter-
section of data science and social science that pursues causal and predictive inference as its two 
main objectives. With roots in mathematical modeling and social simulation in sociology, in 
particular the increasing digitization of life turned CSS into a dynamically developing scientific 
field. The more human life takes place in digital environments, the more behavioral data of 
interest to the social and behavioral sciences accumulate. These data are only available digitally 
and thus require proper “new computational” methods of data collection, data management, 
data processing, and data analysis (Lazer et al., 2020). Delimitations of CSS reference big data, 
computational methods, and data science facets, as detailed in the following.
Perspectives on computational social science methodology
Computational methods in sociology
The impression of an inflationary use of the adjective “computational” is certainly justifiable. 
As Hox (2017, p. 3) states, with explicit consideration of the social and behavioral sciences, it 
seems that almost any scientific field can now be preceded by the adjective “computational”. 
Though it is true that computational methods have reached an extremely high significance, it 
is equally true that the social sciences have developed computational methods from the outset: 
statistical data analysis and mathematical modeling are by no means new computational tools 
in this field. Coleman’s (1964) seminal Mathematical Sociology is one of the best exemplifica-
tions of the precursors of contemporary analytical sociology. Other examples are the Columbia 
School of Social Research and its pioneering development work on multivariate analysis (e.g., 
Lazarsfeld, 1955; Rosenberg, 1968), the mathematical study of change (Coleman, 1968), meth-
ods of replication (Galtung, 1969), prediction studies (e.g., Goodman, 1955), the analysis of 
change through time by panel analysis (e.g., Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1955), Lazarsfeld’s 
latent structure analysis (McCutcheon, 1987), longitudinal data analysis (Coleman, 1981), and 
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multilevel methodology (e.g., Lazarsfeld & Menzel, 1969 [1961]; Coleman et al., 1966; Cole-
man, 1990). The “social simulation modeling” area in CSS and its multilevel approach towards 
social complexity as detailed in Cioffi-Revilla (2017, pp. 12–20, 205ff., 331ff., 470ff.) is also 
highlighted.
Hox (2017, p. 3) refers to the simulation branch when reviewing “three important elements” 
of CSS, namely “big data, analytics, and simulation”. In his view, CSS refers “to the applica-
tion of computational methods to explore and test scientific (social, psychological, economic) 
theories”, the field being “often interpreted as equivalent to the use of big data in social science. 
However, although computational social science relies strongly on big data and the ability to 
analyze these, it also includes computer simulation and text analysis”. Edelmann, Wolff, Mon-
tagne, and Bail (2020, p. 62), too, highlight the simulation branch in CSS. They point out that 
“the term computational social science emerged in the final quarter of the twentieth century 
within social science disciplines as well as science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
(STEM) disciplines”. They continue by writing that within social science, “the term origi-
nally described agent-based modeling – or the use of computer programs to simulate human 
behavior within artificial populations”, whereas within STEM fields, by contrast, “any study 
that employs large datasets that describe human behavior” is “often described as computational 
social science”.
Big data
Shah, Capella, and Neuman (2015, p. 7) views CSS
as a specific subcategory of work on big data. It is an approach to social inquiry defined 
by (1) the use of large, complex datasets, often – though not always – measured in 
terabytes or petabytes; (2) the frequent involvement of “naturally occurring” social and 
digital media sources and other electronic databases; (3) the use of computational or 
algorithmic solutions to generate patterns and inferences from these data; and (4) the 
applicability to social theory in a variety of domains from the study of mass opinion to 
public health, from examinations of political events to social movements.
(emphasis added)
Alvarez (2016, p. 5) stresses in his introduction to Computational Social Science that it is
not about “big data”.  .  .  . Instead, the focus is on the methodological innovations 
driven by the availability of new types of data or by data of a different scale than has been 
previously possible. . . . [T]he emphasis rather is on the cross-disciplinary applications 
of statistical, computational, and machine learning tools to the new types of data, at a 
larger scale, to learn more about politics and policy.
(emphasis added)
Data science
In line with reference to terms such as “analytics” and “statistical, computational, and machine 
learning tools”, one can delimit CSS also by reference to data science. Hox (2017, p. 3), for 
instance, regards CSS as an “interdisciplinary field that includes mathematics, statistics, data 
science, and, of course, social science”. Proponents of data science even tend to subsume CSS 
under this discipline. “Data science” is then regarded as a “new interdisciplinary field that 
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synthesizes and builds on statistics, informatics, computing, communication, management, and 
sociology” . . . “to transform data to insights and decisions” (Cao, 2017, pp. 43, 8). Provost and 
Fawcett (2013, p. 4f.) “view the ultimate goal of data science as improving decision-making, 
as this generally is of direct interest to business”. Similarly, Kelleher and Tierney (2018, p. 1) 
stress as a commonality the focus on “improving decision making through the analysis of data” 
when they point out that the “terms data science, machine learning, and data mining were often 
used interchangeably”. Data science is broader in scope, while machine learning “focuses on the 
design and evaluation of algorithms for extracting patterns from data” and “data mining gener-
ally deals with the analysis of structured data”. Data science
also takes up other challenges, such as the capturing, cleaning, and transforming of 
unstructured social media and web data; the use of big-data technologies to store and 
process big, unstructured data sets; and questions related to data ethics and regulation.
(Kelleher & Tierney, 2018, p. 1f.)
Machine learning and artificial intelligence
The Royal Society (2017, p.  25) localizes machine learning at the intersection of artificial 
intelligence, data science, and statistics, with applications in robotics. In computer science, 
deep learning is viewed as part of machine learning, and machine learning is viewed as part of 
artificial intelligence. Kelleher (2019, p. 4) dates the birth of AI to “a workshop at Dartmouth 
College in the summer of 1956”. The Royal Society (2017, p. 28) outlines a similar picture in 
a timeline on developments in machine learning and AI by mentioning the Turing Test in 1950 
and the Dartmouth Workshop. Part of this timeline also provides a clue that several key concepts 
in machine learning are derived from probability theory and statistics, the roots of which date 
to the 18th century (e.g., Bayes’ theorem). James, Witten, Hastie, and Tibshirani (2013) use 
the term statistical learning and point to the essential role of statistical methods in the machine 
learning field. Ghani and Schierholz (2017, p. 148) write that “over the past 20 years, machine 
learning has become an interdisciplinary field spanning computer science, artificial intelligence, 
databases, and statistics”. It is worth mentioning that the special relevance of machine learning 
derives from both the powerful capabilities of deep learning and artificial intelligence and their 
resulting impact on contemporary society and from the considerably less spectacular machine-
learning applications in statistical data analysis.
Prediction and causal inference
In a similar vein, Kuhn and Johnson (2013, p. 1) refer to machine learning, artificial intelligence, 
pattern recognition, data mining, predictive analytics, and knowledge discovery and point out 
that “while each field approaches the problem using different perspectives and toolsets, the ulti-
mate objective is the same: to make an accurate prediction”. Consequently, the authors pool “these 
terms into the commonly used phrase predictive modeling”. Yarkoni and Westfall (2017, p. 2) 
draw attention to the “underappreciated tension between prediction and explanation”, charac-
terize current practice in psychology as “explanation without prediction”, and raise substantial 
doubts about the predictive power and replicability of such explanatory research. “The crucial 
point is that prediction and replicability are the same problem”, as Hindman (2015, p. 60f.) 
outlines; machine-learning-based approaches produce models that are more likely to be repro-
duced by other scholarship because they are more robust than standard practice and because 
“reducing the out-of-sample error produces more stable findings across different researchers 
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and different studies”. Lin (2015) vigorously defends big data analysis against the reservation 
that this approach neglects theory. He argues, somewhat provocatively, that much of the con-
troversy stems from a fundamental confusion about the purpose of big data. Using the example 
of commercial matchmaking services, he claims “that understanding is not necessary for predic-
tion. . . . Whether any of their matchmaking algorithms are based on their current (academic) 
understanding of attraction is largely irrelevant” (Lin, 2015, p. 39).
This view draws criticism from proponents of causal analysis in social research. Latent vari-
able modeling acts on the assumption that theoretical input is needed for both the measure-
ment and structural part of a causal model. Yet not all explanations predict satisfactorily, and 
not all good predictions explain, as Troitzsch (2009) remarks. Hofman, Sharma, and Watts 
(2017, p. 486) “argue that the increasingly computational nature of social science is beginning 
to reverse (the) traditional bias against prediction”, while highlighting the view that “predic-
tive accuracy and interpretability must be recognized as complements, not substitutes, when 
evaluating explanations”. Similarly, James et al. (2013, Chapter 2) elaborate on doing prediction 
and causal inference within a statistical learning approach. Balancing these two objectives in 
an analysis might be advantageous because prediction accuracy and generalizability cannot be 
maximized simultaneously. While maximizing R2 is certainly suitable for increasing prediction 
accuracy, such a strategy runs the risk of overfitting and impairing the generalizability of found 
results. Data mining thus trusts techniques based on “replication” and “cross-validation”, in 
which the use of training, tuning, and test samples guards against overfitting (Attewell & Mona-
ghan, 2015, p. 14). The power of predicting unseen (out-of-sample) data can be regarded as a 
more relevant criterion than the size of a “theoretically privileged” regression coefficient or a 
model fit statistic (Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017, p. 2).
CSS, data science, and social science
It is constructive to locate CSS in the intersecting set of data science with social science and 
underlay the fields with possible data types, as shown in Figure 9.1. Data science is conceived 
in the broader sense outlined previously. Its core is the machine learning field, along with com-
putational methods for collecting, cleaning, transforming, and processing datasets on even the 
largest scales (Luraschi, Kuo, & Ruiz, 2020).
Computational














Figure 9.1 Causal and predictive inference in CSS
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A substantial overlap exists between statistical methods employed in the machine-learning 
tradition, on the one hand, and the causal and descriptive analysis of observational studies 
in the counterfactual research tradition of social research, on the other hand (Morgan  & 
Winship, 2007). Examples include principal component analysis (PCA), classification and 
clustering methods, and linear and logistic regression, as well as replication methods (e.g., 
James et al., 2013; Kuhn & Johnson, 2013; Lantz, 2019). Despite differences in technical lan-
guage, both traditions share a subset of common statistical learning methods. In addition, both 
research traditions share the objective of inferring valid insights from nonexperimental data. 
This, in turn, requires tools for meeting two overwhelmingly important demands, namely 
the adequate ascertainment of validity and the attainment of effective control over possible 
sources of error.
In Figure 9.1, “Pred. analytics” stands for predictive analytics, to indicate the great impor-
tance attached to prediction and the achievement of prediction accuracy in the machine-learn-
ing framework. However, following James et  al. (2013, Chapter  1), the basic possibility of 
achieving trade-offs between prediction accuracy and model interpretability is also regarded 
as a key feature of the statistical learning approach to data science. It is exactly this feature that 
opens the opportunity of doing both predictive and causal inference within a joint data-science 
framework and thus the opportunity to counterbalance the susceptibility to prediction bias in 
this field.
On the one hand, particular strengths of the statistical learning field include highly flex-
ible modeling options, capabilities of handling nonlinear relationships, and tools for assessing 
validity on a regular basis. On the other hand, in the counterfactual and statistical research 
tradition pursued in the social and behavioral sciences, much effort is invested in latent vari-
able modeling and the development of methodological and statistical tools for coping effec-
tively with potential sources of error, such as confounding factors, selective unit and item 
nonresponse, and measurement effects. Along with the existing overlap of statistical methods, 
a data science that capitalizes on the best of these two worlds appears thus particularly con-
structive. The same is true for a CSS that takes advantage of import from such a data science, 
“even – or rather especially – when their datasets are small” (Hindman, 2015, p. 49), and the 
social and behavioral theories and methodologies that come from the social and behavioral 
sciences.
Big data, digital textual and behavioral trace data, and survey data
Volume (scale of data), velocity (analysis of streaming data), variety (different forms of data), and 
veracity (uncertainty of data) represent the original four Vs of big data (IBM, 2012). To this, add 
the fifth and sixth Vs, virtue (ethics) and value (knowledge gain) (Quan-Haase & Sloan, 2017, 
pp. 5–6). All these Vs make great demands on data collection and analysis. Volume matters: 
Though size is no inherent data quality criterion, large datasets facilitate multivariate analysis 
and validation but can make analysis more complicated (statistical inference, distributed com-
puting). The collection and analysis of streaming data may also require special computational 
tools in the shape of online learning algorithms (see Ippel et al., Chapter 5 in Volume 2 of this 
handbook). In CSS, variety is a challenge through the simultaneous use of quite different kinds 
of data, such as the user-generated content in social media and the digital marks people leave 
when surfing the web. Such textual and digital-trace data complement survey data and make 
great demands on their separate and combined analysis. Veracity refers to the whole spectrum 
of data-quality criteria as, for instance, known in social-science methodology. A whole range of 
issues and challenges is accordingly involved in this regard. These issues become evident when 
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transferring the total error paradigm known from survey methodology to social media research 
(Biemer, 2017; Quan-Haase & Sloan, 2017; Franke et al., 2016; see also Sen et al., Chapter 9 
in Volume 2 of this handbook).
Against the background that a major strand of CSS research develops in the highly fre-
quented social-media context, the perceived close link between CSS and big data reported 
previously comes as no surprise. However, even if both behavior and behavioral marks in digital 
environments cover the major focus of social research in CSS, survey data play an important role 
too. Big data analysis benefits from both the availability of huge pools of compoundable survey 
data (e.g., Warshaw, 2016, p. 28ff.) and the data quality of surveys.
Causal inference in social research
Morgan and Winship (2007) describe the counterfactual model for observational data analy-
sis, also known as the “potential outcomes framework” (Salganik, 2018, pp. 62–70), in greater 
detail. In doing so, they refer extensively to Pearl’s (2000) work on graphical representations 
of causal relationships (graph theory). The authors deal particularly with three basic strate-
gies for estimating causal effects: (1) to condition on variables “that block all backdoor paths 
from the causal variable to the outcome variable”, (2) the use of “exogenous variation in an 
appropriate instrumental variable to isolate covariation in the causal and outcomes variables”, 
and (3) the establishment of an “isolated and exhaustive mechanism that relates the causal 
variable to the outcome variable and then calculates the causal effect as it propagates through 
the mechanism” (Morgan & Winship, 2007, p. 26). The authors present a selective history 
of the use of experimental language in observational social science and regard the counter-
factual model of causality as valuable because it helps researchers “to stipulate assumptions, 
evaluate alternative data analysis techniques, and think carefully about the process of causal 
exposure” (Morgan & Winship, 2007, p. 7). They also refer to “equation-based motivations 
of observational data analysis” to draw attention to the weaknesses of a “naïve usage of regres-
sion modeling”, path analysis, and structural equation modeling as tools for the estimation of 
causal effects. They conclude that the rise of regression has “led to a focus on equations for 
outcomes, rather than careful thinking about how the data in hand differ from what would 
have been generated by the ideal experiments one might wish to have conducted” (Morgan & 
Winship, 2007, p. 13).
Some caution is advisable, indeed, if regression analysis is used for causal analysis. Bollen 
(1989, Chapter 3) uses three criteria to infer cause: isolation, association, and direction of cau-
sation (establishing causal priority). In doing so, the crucial point is that “isolation” designates 
actually a “pseudo-isolation” condition realized by means of assumptions about the error term 
of a regression equation (i.e., that the error is not correlated with the explanatory variable). Such 
assumptions are most important to get the model closed and thereby get changes in y attributa-
ble to corresponding changes in the explanatory variable(s). The clue that regression diagnostics 
are available to test such assumptions on a routine basis is relevant. Furthermore, “theory” plays 
an important role in both the counterfactual model (“the need to clearly articulate assumptions 
grounded in theory, that is believable”, Morgan & Winship, 2007, p. 13) and structural equation 
modeling. The need for basing causal models in substantial theory is challenging in view of the 
basic limitations of model testing procedures. In the end, goodness-of-fit can only prove the 
compatibility of data and model implications, while it cannot rule out alternative models that 
have the same implications as a given tested model (Galtung, 1969; Stinchcombe, 1968, p. 19f.). 
Furthermore, as Pearl (2012, p. 68) notes, there exists a “huge logical gap between “establishing 
causation”, which requires careful manipulative experiments, and “interpreting parameters as 
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causal effects”, which may be based on firm scientific knowledge or on previously conducted 
experiments. . ., to conclude that “as a matter of fact. . ., causal effects in observational studies 
can only be substantiated from a combination of data and untested theoretical assumptions, not 
from the data alone”.
Notwithstanding such basic limitations, “causal models” have prominent roots in the scien-
tific work on path analysis and simultaneous-equation techniques realized in the 1950s and 60s, 
as Blalock’s (1971) collection of such work documents. Since then, structural equation mod-
eling and, more generally, latent variable (mixture) modeling evolved into a highly advanced 
tool for the statistical analysis of observational data; with strengths in controlling for (1) random 
and systematic measurement error, (2) methods effects by MTMM modeling (e.g., Marsh & 
Grayson, 1995), and (3) data missing at random and data not missing at random, by multiple 
imputation and selection/pattern mixture modeling (e.g., Winship & Morgan, 1999; Enders, 
2010, van Buuren, 2018).
From the outset, longitudinal modeling using panel data played an essential role (e.g., Bla-
lock, 1985; Coleman, 1981; Hagenaars, 1990), among other things, in securing by this repeated 
measurement design the validity of a key assumption of causal inference: that the alleged cause 
must precede the effect. As de Vaus (2001, p. 34 ff.) outlines, it must make sense to infer cause 
from covariation; he notes three criteria for the necessary plausibility in this respect: (1) time 
order (cause must come before the effect; see Bollen (1989, p. 61f.) for a discussion of this cri-
terion), (2) the dependent variable must be capable of change, and (3) the causal assertion must 
make sense theoretically. A panel design is basically constructive in this regard because causal 
order may be derived from the temporal order between the panel waves. Longitudinal mod-
eling using this design changed somewhat from the classical cross-lagged panel model to latent 
growth curve modeling (e.g., Byrne, 2012). This latter design is not only particularly suitable 
for multi-wave panel data; this type of model avoids an inherent weakness of the classical, cross-
lagged panel model (potential disparity in corresponding temporal and causal lag), performs 
causal analysis using concomitant (instead of residual) change as an indication of causality and 
realizes the combination of longitudinal and multilevel modeling (Engel & Meyer, 1996; Engel, 
Gattig, & Simonson, 2007).
Descriptive inference in large datasets
Specific scientific ends that large datasets tend to enable are the study of rare events, the study of 
heterogeneity, and the detection of small differences (Salganik, 2018, pp. 18–20).
McFarland and MacFarland (2015, p. 1) draw attention to statistical significance testing in 
case of big observational “found data” from social media and explain that the results in such 
cases “give analysts a false sense of security as they proceed to focus on employing traditional 
statistical methods” because hidden biases (for instance, population bias) would be easily “over-
looked due to the enhanced significance of the results”. As Salganik (2018, p. 20) put it in his 
elaboration on “ten common characteristics of big data”: “While bigness does reduce the need 
to worry about random error, it actually increases the need to worry about systematic errors, the 
kind of errors . . . that arise from biases in how data are created”. Hox (2017, p. 10) refers to 
cross-validation and raises the question of how much room is there at the bottom: “how well do 
these techniques work with ‘small Big Data’.” He points out that the formal testing of structural 
equation models becomes problematic in the case of usual sample sizes of comparative survey 
research because a small degree of misfit already rejects the model. The respective sensitivity of 
the likelihood ratio chi2 test to sample size and the usual solution through an array of goodness-
of-fit indices is well known (e.g., Byrne2012, pp.  66–77). Hox (2017, p.  10) continues by 
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stating that “a cross-validation or k-fold approach that analyses how well the structural equation 
model predicts actual scores in the holdout samples provides a much more direct test”.
Validity of inference
Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002, p. 34) use “the term validity to refer to the approximate 
truth of an inference”. They distinguish the four well-known standard concepts of validity and list 
threats pertaining to each of them (Shadish et al. (2002, pp. 37–39, 64ff.). Accordingly, statisti-
cal conclusion validity refers to inferences about the existence and size of covariation between 
treatment and outcome; internal validity reflects the approximate truth of an inference about 
whether an observed covariation between treatment and outcome reflects a causal relationship. 
Then, two further concepts cover aspects of the generalizability of inferences. While external 
validity designates the generalizability of inferences over variations in persons, settings, treat-
ment, and outcomes, construct validity refers to inferences about what is being measured by 
outcome measurements and thus covers the generalizability to the higher-order constructs they 
represent. We can use these concepts as benchmarks for data-driven inference in CSS.
Threats to statistical conclusion validity
Shadish et al. (2002, pp. 45–52) present a longer list of threats to statistical conclusion valid-
ity. The reasons inferences about covariation between two variables may be incorrect include, 
among other things, two reasons with special relevance to big data analysis: violated assumptions 
of statistical tests and unreliability of measures. Clustered/nested data violate the assumption of 
independently distributed errors, while unreliability attenuates bivariate relationships. The sug-
gested solution to the former threat is accordingly multilevel analysis; the suggested solution to 
the latter is latent variable modeling of observed measures.
Threats to internal validity
Threats to the internal validity of inferences may be due to the lack of longitudinal data that 
would allow for repeated measurements at the individual level. A possible consequence is an 
ambiguous temporal precedence of putative cause and effect, a well-known topic in cross-
sectional data analysis. Beyond that aspect, mis-specified models may come along with biased 
estimates of causal effects. Examples include improper functional forms of regression equa-
tions, such as assumed linearity in the case of nonlinear relationships. Omitted and unneeded 
explanatory variables may also threaten internal validity and thus cause a need to check formal 
requirements using “regression diagnostics” (Kohler & Kreuter, 2017, pp. 290–310). Systematic 
measurement and nonresponse error are likely to cause biased estimates, too.
Threats to external validity
Low selection quality is certainly a threat in this regard. If units of analysis are selected from a 
frame, selection quality depends on frame quality, sampling mode, and selective nonresponse. 
This implies that even N = ALL analyses may be impaired, as in the case of the “near-census 
projects” referred to by Lazer and Radford (2017, p. 29). In survey methodology, the quality of 
sampling frames matters, for instance, in the case of (online) access panels (Engel, 2015). In digi-
tal media research, the corresponding question is who uses a platform for what reasons and who 
does not? The generalizability of inferences over different platform-specific user populations, or 
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the generalizability to the general population, depends accordingly on platform-specific popu-
lation composition. Ruths and Pfeffer (2014, p. 1064) exemplify this point by explicating, “the 
ways in which users view Twitter as a space for political discourse affects how representative 
political content will be” (similarly, Kim et al., 2014, p. 1984). As Lazer and Radford (2017, 
p. 29) put it: “big data often is a census of particular, conveniently accessible social world. All 
of Twitter is a census of Twitter. Data from Kickstarter are a census of Kickstarter”. In addi-
tion, sampling mode (random vs. nonprobability) matters, as do possible selection effects due to 
technical (API) restrictions, privacy settings, guards against tracking, and the potential require-
ment of informed consent in digital forms of data collection (e.g., Keyling & Jünger, 2016, 
pp. 188–191). Then, selective nonresponse is likely to impair the generalizability – and thus the 
external validity – of sample-based inference to the very population from which the sample has 
been drawn.
Threats to construct validity
The “promise of big data collection is that expensive data collections are replaced by less 
costly ‘found’ data, and that sampling is replaced by analyzing all existing data: N  =  All, 
avoiding sampling error” (Hox, 2017, p.  8). On the one hand, this implies a waiving of 
carefully designed survey measurement instruments and, in turn, a waiving of any planned 
conceptualization and measurement of higher-order constructs. Mahrt and Scharkow (2013, 
p.  27) discuss “data-driven rather than theory-driven operationalization” and “availability 
bias” and conclude that researchers “should be aware that the most easily available measure 
may not be the most valid one, and they should discuss to what degree its validity converges 
with that of established instruments”. Qiu, Chan, and Chan (2018, p. 61f.) address the topic 
of measurement validity in cases where “second-hand data collected by others such as social 
media services or mobile phone companies” were used. Among other things, they discuss 
three issues that can introduce measurement errors: noise due to non-individual accounts, 
machine-generated coding, and the need to use proxies for variables of interest. On the other 
hand, the non-reactive nature of such found data appears advantageous. Shah et al. (2015, 
p. 7) refer to this topic of “unobtrusive measures” (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest, 
1966). They use the phrase “naturally occurring” data and contrast these data with data from 
surveys and experiments and the typically associated biases through “experimenter effects” 
and “self-report/social desirability”. The argument is that error-prone self-reports on behav-
ior obtained, for instance, in survey research, are that way replaceable by unnoticed direct 
observations of the behavior itself.
Yet the crucial point is that “motivated misreporting” (Tourangeau, Kreuter, & Eckman, 
2015) is not confined to survey research. Lazer and Radford (2017, p. 23) refer to “big data 
archives” and point out that such archives offer in principle “measures of actual behaviors, 
as compared with self-reports of behaviors”. They continue by stating that “generally, self-
reported behavior is noisy, with a variety of systemic biases. For example, people systematically 
lie about everything from whether they voted to what their weight and height are”. Even if 
motivated misreporting can be ruled out with respect to the research process itself, found data 
are not error free only because they were obtained unobtrusively. Salganik (2018, p. 24) illus-
trates this point using the example of self-reports on Facebook. The story is simply that in the 
first instance, a self-report is a self-report irrespective of its (survey vs. social media) context 
embedment. However, that embedment may distinguish between surveys that guarantee strict 
anonymity and posts in the social media that are published information, likely with hidden 
reference/target groups as addressees in mind.
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Beyond that, the meaning of the behavior observed in digital environments is only decipher-
able on the basis of hypotheses. Social science methodology usually precludes the possibility 
of hypothesis-free observation. A core question is, then: “What is the theoretical validity and 
significance of the data?” Following Mahrt and Scharkow (2013, p. 29), this example may illus-
trate the point:
The number of times a message gets forwarded (“retweeted”) on Twitter, for instance, 
may show a certain degree of interest by users, but without looking at the content 
and style of a tweet, “interest” could stand for popularity and support, revulsion and 
outrage, or simply the thoughtless routines of Twitter usage behavior.
Generalizability and replicability
Generalizability is a topic that covers much more than the previous population aspect. Galtung 
(1969, p. 316f.) provided a quite undisguised view of this topic as he took the perspective, 
“given a hypothesis H, show me the set of conditions C under which it is tenable”, where time, 
space, and social background often be the most important variables. “An effort to generalize, 
then, is an effort to try out the hypothesis for other points or regions in the condition-space”. 
Given the hypothesis is then confirmed for this new value of one or more condition variables, 
“we have a clear case of generalization”; otherwise, we would have to increase the complexity 
of the hypothesis by “working the condition variable into the hypothesis”. If generalization is 
understood that way, then generalization implies replicability, and then replication attempts are 
theoretically directable towards any relevant condition variable, including variables related to 
conceptualization, measurement, data collection, and data analysis. Following Galtung (1969, 
p. 437 ff.), the target of systematic replication may then be pursued to increase the degree of 
confirmation of hypotheses/propositions by decreasing “the tenability of the argument that the 
findings are artefacts of the method”.
In a recent classification of forms of replication in quantitative social science, this variant 
relates to “robustness” if the original data are used and “generalization” if new data are used for 
replication attempts. This classification distinguishes four possible replication goals (Freese & 
Peterson, 2017, p. 152): verifiability to check if the results of an original study are reproducible 
if the same analysis is performed on the same data, robustness to check how far target findings 
are merely the result of analytic decisions if a reanalysis on the original data uses alternative 
specifications, repeatability to determine whether key results of a study can be replicated by 
applying the original procedures to new data, and generalization to check if similar findings may 
be observed consistently across different methods or settings. The latter clearly involves repli-
cation attempts across datasets, for instance, as are involved in checks of the generalizability of 
findings obtained in a training set to the “unseen data” of a related holdout dataset. This practice 
certainly makes a good case for a key element of data-science practice, the use of independent, 
out-of-sample validation and cross-validation schemata, respectively.
Sources of variation
Conceptualization and measurement
The analysis of data from nonexperimental social research forces the researcher into unavoidable 
decisions in relation to the three major stages of conceptualization, modeling, and validation. 
Because any of these decisions can theoretically affect the final score, Figure 9.2 regards these 
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deciding areas accordingly as possible sources of variation and presents them as an interleaved 
structure to mirror the relevant dependencies.
A first source of variation concerns the theoretical constructs of an analysis in relation to 
their supposed indicator variables. The general question is what indicator variable(s) best suit 
the theoretical concept(s). This question is particularly relevant in case the concept–indicator 
relation is not free of ambiguity. For instance, if voting behavior is used to indicate a person’s 
inclination to vote for the extreme right, an ambiguous relation arises whenever relevant politi-
cal parties consist of substantial currents of both moderate forces that adhere to the constitution 
of a country and extremist forces that try to overcome it. Then unambiguous coding of extrem-
ism is not possible using voting behavior as the sole indicator variable. This ambiguity is the 
more relevant the more popular is the party in the country in question. In today’s sociological 
research, a related question is how far right a political party must be settled to pass the threshold 
from populism to extremism.
Measurement and modeling
Given a theoretical concept, the choice of suitable indicator variables is related to the question 
of how to bridge the levels of theoretical construct(s) and indicator variable(s) methodologically. 
Well-known options include the use of single- vs. multiple-indicator models and the explicit 
consideration of theoretical constructs by index formation, latent variable modeling, or a com-
bination of both. Multiple-indicator models outmatch corresponding single-indicator models 
by a potentially better coverage of construct meaning. The inclination towards the political 
far right, for instance, might then be based on self-reports on voting behavior, the perceived 
closeness to political parties, and self-assessments on the common left-right scale. In addition, if 
constructs are related to eligible indicator variables by latent variable modeling and thus by test-
able correspondence hypotheses, then empirical testing replaces otherwise untested but believed 
assumptions. Similar advantageous features of the latent-variable framework are the checkability 
and control of random and systematic measurement error and the enabling of flexible modeling 
strategies within a wide array of options. Despite this principal flexibility, the focus remains on 
modeling perspectives that work with supposed functional forms instead of targeting the very 
functional form(s) that suit some relevant data best. James et al. (2013, p. 16 ff.) use a regression-
like equation of the general form
Y f X    
to introduce this distinction and a related localization of statistical learning methods in an ana-
lytical space, built to represent the trade-off between their flexibility vs. interpretability. A suit-
able choice of such methods then depends on whether an analysis seeks primarily descriptive/
Conceptualization Modeling Validation
Measurement Estimation Within- Out-of-sample
Cross- Independent 
Figure 9.2 Conceptualization, modeling, and validation as sources of variation in nonexperimental research
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causal inference, on the one hand, or unit-related prediction, on the other hand. Similarly, 
model design depends on these superordinate orientations. Simply to refer to the target com-
plexity of models in terms of variables and functions: attempts at increasing the prediction 
accuracy of a model are likely to lead to comparably larger than smaller numbers of predictor/
explanatory variables, while the reverse can be expected in the case of attempts at revealing, 
for instance, individual statistical/causal effects of particular interest. In addition, attempts at 
increasing prediction accuracy are likely to lead to models that estimate nonlinearities and sta-
tistical interactions often assumed/restricted to be zero in standard models for the estimation of 
linear and additive effects.
Modeling and estimation
The large variety of standard and robust estimation methods is well known to statisticians, 
data scientists, and structural equation modelers. Regularization is a standard topic in the 
machine-learning literature. The same holds true for the treatment of missing data caused by 
unit and item nonresponse in the statistical analysis of survey data. The proper treatment of 
clustered data structures by multilevel modeling is a further case in point. All such modeling/
estimation options require decisions on how to proceed and, theoretically, any of these deci-
sions can affect the final score. This fact calls for sensitivity analysis and systematic replica-
tion. Following recent suggestions (e.g., Harms, 2019; Ly, Etz, Marsman, & Wagenmakers, 
2019), the computation of replication Bayes factors as an alternative to hypothesis testing in 
the frequentist tradition may be considered. Recently, the computation of Bayes factors was 
also proposed for the selection of replication targets (Field, Hoekstra, Bringmann,  & van 
Ravenzwaaij, 2019).
Estimation and validation
Model estimation implies commonly used goodness-of-fit statistics (e.g., Byrne, 2012, 
pp. 66–77; Beaujean, 2014, pp. 153–166). The list includes the popular likelihood ratio chi2 
test statistic, incremental indices of fit (comparative fit index [CFI] and Tucker–Lewis index 
[TLI]), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), the standardized root mean 
square residual (SRMR), the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC), and the mean square error (MSE), all of them for within-sample evaluations 
of model fit. Browne and Cudeck’s (1993, p.  147 ff.) content validity index (CVI) and 
expected content validity index (ECVI) are two variants for cross-validation that also belong 
to the collection of common indices of fit. The CVI is the cross-validation index for two 
independent samples from the same population: a “calibration sample” and a “validation 
sample”. The model is fitted to the observed calibration sample covariance matrix to deter-
mine to what extent the implied (estimated) covariance matrix fits the observed covariance 
matrix of the validation sample. Phrased in today’s data-science parlance, the procedure 
relates a fitted covariance obtained in a training sample to the corresponding observed 
covariance matrix of a holdout sample. Then the ECVI designates the expected value of the 
cross-validation index. This value is estimated for both calibration and validation samples, 
“using the calibration sample alone” for computing it (Browne & Cudeck, 1993, p. 148). In 
this manner, the ECVI represents a substitute for a real cross-validation. The ECVI is sub-
sumed under the parsimony indexes and regarded as a “single-sample approximation to the 
cross-validation coefficient obtained from a validation sample” (Beaujean, 2014, p. 160 f.). 
The index is used for model comparisons and is akin to the AIC in reflecting “the extent 
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to which parameter estimates from an original sample will cross-validate in future samples” 
(Byrne, 2012, p. 72).
Model fit is assessable in different ways. The researcher has a choice between different fit 
criteria, and the final score may vary depending on that decision. If the criteria suggest con-
trary decisions as to the acceptability of a model in question, the situation is comparable to 
the p-hacking strategy discussed in the literature and is as problematic as this strategy. Yarkoni 
and Westfal (2017, p. 4 f.), for instance, describe p-hacking as a practice of procedural overfit-
ting, “of flexibly selecting analytical procedures based in part on the quality of the results they 
produce”. Similarly, Freese and Peterson (2017, p. 155) trace the “abiding concern .  .  . that 
published findings represent a best-case scenario among all the arbitrary and debatable decisions 
made over the course of analyzing data” back to “p-hacking, in which a researcher runs different 
analyses until they find support for their preferred hypothesis”. An ambiguous overall picture of 
fit criteria is a realistic scenario given the potential weaknesses of model testing, for instance, in 
the SEM context. The list includes impairments due to the use of chi2-based statistics in large 
samples, fit criteria that enable only relative assessment across models, and acceptability thresh-
olds on single indices that are only approximately settable in the end. Therefore, both single-fit 
criteria and the overall picture that emerges from reviewing the possible fit criteria for a given 
model in conjunction must be considered. Given ambiguous overall evaluations, it is certainly 
problematic to simply pitch selectively on the subset of criteria that confirm a model while 
neglecting other relevant criteria. Transferred to the regression context, a similarly ambiguous 
situation arises if an acceptable R2 goes along with the diagnosis that assumptions about the 
model’s error term are possibly violated. In this regard, it is clearly more constructive not to 
rely only on the MSE and the related R2. The correct use of modeling frameworks (e.g., linear 
model, generalized linear model) and estimators (e.g., OLS, WLS, ML) presume sets of testable 
assumptions. Narrowing the spectrum of possible modeling alternatives to the ones that meet 
such requirements is a sensible choice.
Validation requires fixing relevant fit criteria and evaluation metrics, respectively, for in-sam-
ple and out-of-sample evaluation. Out-of-sample orientation is a core feature of data science 
and machine learning. Basic choices include cross-validation and independent (concurrent, 
prognostic/temporal) replication. Kelleher and Tierney (2018, pp. 145–148), Ghani and Schi-
erholz (2017, pp. 173–180), and James et al. (2013, pp. 176–186) describe relevant foundations 
and validation schemata. In doing validation in an out-of-sample orientation, a key idea is to 
evaluate a model in question on “unseen data”, that is, on data not used for building and maybe 
improving a model in question. The availability of different options that allow validation itself 
to become a possible source of variation of the final score is noteworthy.
A case study of political extremism
The present analysis uses pooled data from rounds 1 to 9 of the European Social Survey (ESS) 
and includes all countries with continuous participation over these rounds. For it, we pooled 
two original ESS data sources, the cumulative file for rounds 1 to 8 and the file for round 9 
(ESS, European Social Survey Cumulative File, ESS 1–8 (2018) and European Social Survey 
Round 9 Data (2018)). This results in an overall sample size of 340,215 respondents. A detailed 
documentation of this analysis (design, R script, results, link to the data frame used for analysis) 
is published at https://github.com/viewsandinsights/inference. The target variable is affinity 
to the political far-right in Europe. Because the emphasis is placed on the far in far-right and 
thus on a relatively small population group in many EU countries, a large overall sample size is 
required for a survey analysis of these groups. The pooled ESS data offer this option along with 
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the additional advantage of enabling time-related studies of the political far-right in Europe. We 
refer to this analysis for addressing causal inference in a setting that uses (1) big (survey) data, (2) 
different validation strategies known from the machine-learning context (independent replica-
tion using training/test samples and cross-validation), and (3) systematic replication in the case 
of unavoidable decisions concerning data management and measurement (coding ambiguity, 
proxy variables, scope in concept specification, and missing data treatment).
Theoretical background
The analysis examines the affiliation to the political far-right as a function of prejudice formation, 
value orientation, and trust. It follows the general idea that prejudice formation is understand-
able as a response to competitive relations in open societies that prize freedom. Esses, Jackson, 
Dovidio, and Hodson (2005, p. 227f.) point out that concerns for group status produce com-
petition between groups for material resources and for value dominance in which “competition 
exacerbates prejudice between groups”. The theoretical expectation is that “in social contexts in 
which equality of opportunity is prized and social mobility is encouraged, perceived competi-
tion is likely” (Esses et al., 2005, p. 229), because then “members of even the lowest group are 
encouraged to put forth effort, to rise, and to demand their rights” (Allport, 1954/1979, p. 222). 
As Esses et al. (2005, p. 229) formulate this idea, “allowance, or encouragement, of upward social 
mobility makes evident the possibility of downward mobility, which, in the presence of a visually 
salient outgroup, generates competition and animosity”. Accordingly, the expected “outcome of 
competition is stereotyped and/or overtly hostile attitudes toward competitor groups”.
A second background element is inspired by previous research on right-wing authoritarian-
ism. Only loosely following up the pioneering “Berkeley theory” of Adorno, Frenkel-Brun-
swik, Levinson, and Sanford’s (1950) Authoritarian Personality, Altemeyer (1996) studied this 
phenomenon empirically in greater detail. He pictures authoritarians as characters who believe 
that proper authorities should be trusted and deserve obedience and respect. He refers to per-
ceived established authorities as those “people in our society who are usually considered to have 
a general legal or moral authority over the behavior of others”, usually one’s parents, religious 
officials, civic officers (the police, judges, heads of governments), and superiors in military ser-
vice (Altemeyer, 1996, pp. 8–12). However, the “perceived” established authorities may be oth-
ers as well. As Altemeyer (1996, p. 9) explains, some “extremists may reject normal authorities 
who (it seems to them) have betrayed the real, fundamental established authority: for example 
(their perception of) God’s will, or the Constitution. They often believe the government has 
been taken over by Jews, homosexuals, feminists, Communists, and so on. Such extremists are 
right-wing authoritarian in this context – “superpatriots” who see themselves as upholding 
traditional values but whose fear and self-righteousness hammer with such intensity that they 
rehearse for violence and may cross the line to violence itself ”. Altemeyer (1996, p. 10) stresses 
that he is “using “right-wing” in a psychological sense of submitting to the perceived authori-
ties in one’s life”, meaning psychological “right-wingers in their support for those they were 
raised to believe were the legitimate authorities”. This spotlights the psychological relationship 
individuals may have to the principle of authority and the adherence to this principle in the 
contexts of contemporary life.
Prejudice formation and the political far right
Figure 9.3 graphs the assumed possible effect structures schematically. The analysis is aimed at a 
decision as to the causal status of the prejudice-to-far-right path. We refer to the section “Causal 
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Inference in Social Research” and check two criteria: (1) does values act as an instrumental vari-
able whose effect on far-right affinity runs exclusively via prejudice formation, and (2) does trust 
act as an intervening (vs. antecedent) variable over which the effect of prejudice on far-right 
affinity is transmitted? These questions can be answered by checking the dashed arrows: it should 
be reasonable to assume that a potential direct effect of values on far-right drops to zero if prejudice is 
introduced or that prejudice affects trust, not vice versa, while trust affects far-right at the same time.
Validation in causal inference
As detailed elsewhere (https://github.com/viewsandinsights/inference), structural equation 
modeling is used to clarify the causal status of the prejudice-to-far-right path. Apart from the 
sociological interest in the subject matter, a series of systematic model comparisons was real-
ized to explore model fit (chi2, RMSEA, CFI, TLI, SRMR, ECVI) embedded in three basic 
validation strategies: (1) using a 70 to 30 percent random split of training and test sample, (2) 
using a systematic time-related split of training sample (data from ESS rounds 1 to 6) and test 
sample (data from rounds 7 to 9), and (3) using Browne and Cudeck’s ECVI measure as a single-
sample approximation to the cross-validation coefficient. Strategies (1) and (2) appear particu-
larly important to take advantage of the causal graph approach referred to previously (“Causal 
Inference in Social Research”). A useful feature of this approach is its capability of deriving 
from a causal structure of effects and related checks for backdoor paths and instrumental and 
intervening variables the insight into which of the involved effects must be controlled for to 
avoid confounding and spurious estimates of effects. However, this moves causal inference close 
to circular reasoning: If a causal structure is already accepted as true in advance, there is no need 
to identify any such conditions. Then the model identifies causal effects properly, or it does not. 
However, if a model is only tentatively taken for granted and, if necessary, inductively elaborated 
on further in a training phase, then it makes much sense trying to validate such inductively 
improved models using the “unseen” data of a test sample.
Systematic replication in case of measurement alternatives
The political far right is approached in two ways: first, by the most-right category “10” on the 
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(sample estimate: 3.1% Europe-wide across all rounds and countries); second, by classifying 
pertinent political parties as far right following previous work in political science and additional 
sources. A detailed list of the country-specific coding sources used for this classification is part 
of the R script cited previously in “A Case Study of Political Extremism”. Across all rounds and 
countries, 1.3% of the respondents expressed affinities (“feeling close” or “vote for”) to these 
far-right parties. Combining both measures yields an estimate of 4.3% affinity either way. Both 
assessments are correlated with r = 0.092.
Worth mentioning in this connection is a practically unreducible ambiguity in the coding 
of right-wing parties as far right if they consist of currents of both loyal and hostile forces to a 
country’s constitution. In the present analysis, this ambiguity created occasional scope for alter-
native coding decisions and, thus, subsequent variation of results.
Proxy variables
While the ESS data contain suitable indicator variables for the measurement of hostile attitudes 
towards immigrants, no direct indicator of the perceived competition in society is available. In 
lieu of this information, a proxy variable is used by acting on the auxiliary assumption that com-
petitive relationships strengthen the motivational tendency to overreach others in the general 
pursuit of self-interest. The need for switching to proxy variables is certainly a limiting factor 
even when using an advanced causal analysis technique such as latent variable modeling at the 
same time. In the present case, this also applies to the measurement of right-wing authoritari-
anism by the human values scale. This scale is part of the standard ESS questionnaire program, 
which is an excellent instrument, although not specifically designed to measure the construct in 
question. It too is accordingly used as a proxy measure and exemplifies for the survey context 
a situation like the use of social media data in the CSS context: the use of proxy data because 
those data are available, even if more suitable measures are theoretically imaginable.
Concluding remarks
The social sciences are currently discovering machine learning (ML) as the new promise of 
replicable results because ML offers advanced statistical means and aims at balancing the pre-
dictive validity and generalizability of results. ML is clearly directed to predictive modeling 
and the target of maximizing prediction accuracy. Because too-accurately predicted findings 
run the risk of impaired generalizability to unseen data, at the same time, a guard against 
overfitting is realized by use of large datasets and validation through proving the replicability 
of results found in a training setting to the unseen data of holdout settings. Such a validation 
strategy comes along with a change of perspective from within-sample goodness-of-fit testing 
to assessing out-of-sample prediction error and bears basically on replication in relation to 
datasets. However, replication is a more general principle. Replication may also be targeted 
at other elements of a social research design/study, for instance, at the latent concepts, the 
observed variables, and all methods-related settings. This focus on replication has already 
allowed it to appear to be constructive to align CSS research with machine learning and 
the modeling, estimation, and evaluation tools therein. Statistical learning and the statistical 
analysis of observational data, as we practice it in social science research, have many statistical 
methods in common.
It would, however, be misleading and far from any sound balancing of explanation and 
prediction to abstain from causal inference in CSS. Causal modeling can look back on a long 
history in social research, and latent variable modeling implies powerful capabilities of dealing 
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with measurement error. The social and behavioral sciences aim centrally at understanding 
their scientific objects, and this understanding cannot go without appropriate theories about 
these objects. Hence, such theories are needed and must be subjected to proper empirical tests. 
However, irrespective of a possible focus on within- or out-of-sample validation, such tests can 
only help to decide if the implications of a theoretical model appear sufficiently consistent with 
some data in hand. This fact sets any such testing boundaries because even if such a model is 
proved consistent in this regard, no alternative theory/model with the same implications as the 
tested model is ruled out. This indefiniteness clearly weakens the theoretical significance of any 
such testing unless we conduct crucial tests in which a tested theory implies the negation of 
implications of some alternative theory.
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